Counter/Consensus: Made in America, NATO, South Korean Transition, and Thailand's Border Dispute

1. Made in America (Counter)

Make America Cheap Again. Since early 2025, the Trump administration has wielded tariffs to incentivize domestic manufacturing and reshoring by American companies. But at the moment, our data indicates that U.S. policy and consumer sentiment on the matter are increasingly misaligned, to U.S. companies’ detriment.

As of June 2025, 59% of U.S. consumers say they intentionally seek out “Made in America” products at least some of the time. Though above the majority mark, that share has declined by 6 points relative to last year and is just shy of a tracking low. Meanwhile, only 15% of consumers say they seek out such products more routinely. What’s more, the share of U.S. consumers who say they would pay more for “Made in America” products has declined by a similar amount and currently sits at only 42%, with the overwhelming majority of those consumers unwilling to pay above 10% extra for domestically manufactured goods.

What gives? As we describe further in the 2025 edition of our Made in America Report which published earlier today), we think rising price sensitivity — defined as consumers’ willingness to forgo a purchase when faced with higher-than-expected pricing — is partly to blame.

In particular, early 2024 (specifically from March onwards) saw four consecutive months of sustained increases in sensitivity, followed by a plateau at elevated levels lasting through H2 2024. Not coincidentally (at least in our view), the timing of this shift overlaps with the most pronounced downturn we’ve seen in consumers’ appetite for “Made in America” products and their willingness to pay more for them, findings which hold across virtually all demographic cuts we examine. Consumers also continue to indicate that when it comes to their purchase consideration, affordability trumps all, bolstering our confidence in these price sensitivity dynamics.

If there’s a silver lining in our data, it’s that for U.S. companies that are considering reshoring amid the Trump tariffs or already manufacture domestically, there are still many ways to incentivize consumers to buy in (both literally and figuratively), ranging from playing up nationalist narratives to emphasizing job creation, though not U.S. competitiveness (which Americans don’t care about that much). See the report for our full assessment.

2. NATO (Consensus)

Losing faith. Majorities of adults in five Western European NATO countries now view the trans-Atlantic alliance as no longer strong or reliable due to current U.S. politics, while most Americans remain confident in NATO's strength amid this week’s NATO summit in the Hague.

If it needs to be said, “current politics” means U.S. President Donald Trump. The administration's repeated threats to withdraw from NATO and speculation about Washington not defending its allies have undermined the mutual trust essential to alliance cohesion, with specific events like Vice President J.D. Vance’s comments at the Munich Security Forum accelerating the decline.

All by design, members of the Trump administration would say. Scaring European allies into finally investing in their own defense rather than happily sitting under the U.S. security umbrella has been a stated objective of the Trump administration since before its first term. 

And this has arguably worked. The best example of the success of this approach is Germany’s recent €1 trillion defense and infrastructure package, alongside a new alliance proposal to raise members’ annual defense spending targets from 2% to 5% of gross domestic product, though actually implementing the new targets domestically is another matter. Spain’s refusal to accept the new 5% targets in the Hague threw cold water on efforts to show European unity. 

In order to make the kinds of issue linkages that could keep Trump at the table, Europe needs to find a way to speak with a non-NATO unified voice on defense. Efforts like Weimar+, the ReArm Europe Plan and the E.U.-U.K. security pact talks are steps in this direction. Not only do they move toward greater strategic autonomy, but they put Europe in a stronger position vis-à-vis the United States when seeking to keep Washington engaged in providing the aid that only it can currently provide. Other allies could also join Europe in seeking to create alternative axes within NATO. The Canada-E.U. security and defense partnership announced at the summit is a clear example of this. It turns out when one ally threatens to invade multiple other allied countries, they might decide to try to create alternative structures. 

3. South Korea (Consensus)

Sins of the predecessor. South Korea has had a turbulent half year, with former president Yoon’s declaration of martial law in late 2024 ushering in a period of government instability, impeachment, and ultimately elections on June 3, 2025. The country is known for its revenge politics, with each of the last six presidents going back to 2003 facing criminal investigations by subsequent administrations. Koreans are very much lending President Lee their optimism that this time will be different, but it looks unlikely the goodwill will stick around. 

President Lee has promised to break the cycle of political retribution, and has presided over a jump in job approval, as most leaders do upon taking office. He is currently enjoying a tracking high compared with all prior presidents whose approval we’ve tracked in Korea, a metric we first began monitoring in June 2020. However, both Moon and Yoon saw net positive approval ratings earlier in their terms (though Yoon just barely), making it possible the current high is just the start of the next cycle of optimism and retribution in South Korean politics.

On the one hand, after a brush with martial law, it would be hard for Lee to do worse than Yoon in the eyes of the electorate, particularly so soon into his term. Koreans are also much more optimistic today than in the waning months of Yoon’s presidency that the country is headed in the right direction. This is the first time they have been optimistic on balance since 2022, and if that optimism lasts for more than a few days, it will be the first time since 2020 they have felt this good about the country’s trajectory. Lee has the benefit of the doubt from the Korean people. 

But while Lee might meet the low bar of not declaring martial law, there are reasons to think that Korean politics remains very much the same punitive game it has been for the last 20 years. Unpromisingly, Lee has already launched a probe into his predecessor, and into corruption charges against Yoon’s wife. And Lee  himself has been the subject of several legal cases dating back to 2018, making him an unlikely candidate to step outside of the cycle of revenge.

When the stakes for political success or failure change from mere victory or loss of public office to whether a candidate spends the next decade in jail, civil discourse in politics becomes more unlikely, and the facts of legal cases become subject to political interpretation. The pattern of dirty politics in South Korea, along with Lee’s initial actions, unfortunately make it appear that currently optimistic South Koreans are set up for disappointment.

4. Thailand (Counter)

Thai’d in knots. Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra announced a cabinet reshuffle earlier this week in an attempt to cling to the premiership following a political scandal linked to a border dispute with Cambodia. In late May, Thailand and Cambodia’s on-again off-again border dispute flared anew when the Thai military shot and killed a Cambodian soldier. Several weeks after the incident, Paetongtarn was caught on tape criticizing her country’s own military during a call with Cambodian officials, causing a major political party to withdraw from Paetongtarn’s governing coalition, followed by threats of a no-confidence vote and, in an attempt to placate both the Thai military and the public, a cabinet reshuffle.

Our data suggests the border dispute (having now turned sideways) is a missed opportunity for the Thai prime minister. In the days immediately following the onset of the dispute, public approval of Paetongtarn saw a boost after several months of declines, pointing to a near-term rally around the flag effect that could have benefited her government. But in the days thereafter, approval fell sharply, likely in response to public perceptions that Paetongtarn’s reaction to the dispute was overly soft given a longstanding friendship between the Shinawatras and Cambodia’s ruling Hun family. Public approval of the Thai Prime Minister then fell even further once a recording of the aforementioned call was leaked on June 18. And in a nod to just how much Paetongtarn’s handling of the incident has riled the public, her worsening approval rating is being driven primarily by a sharp uptick in the share of Thai adults who “strongly disapprove” of her performance.

To be sure, Thailand’s Prime Minister has seen better days, and she will be hard-pressed to right the ship given the intensity with which public sentiment has turned against her, particularly in a country that has a history of military involvement in politics (including through coups). But what’s worth recalling is that Paetongtarn’s government was losing its luster well before the latest border dispute, with approval beginning a downward slide far earlier in the year amid persistent growth concerns and related worries about the Trump tariffs. All that to say that while the government’s handling of the border dispute may ultimately prove to be the final nail in the coffin, it would certainly not be the only one.

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