Globally, Public Support for Palestinians Does Not Equate to Support for Iran

The conflict in the Middle East ignited by Hamas’ attacks on Israel last October has come closer than ever to bursting into a regional conflagration between Israel on one side, and Iran and its proxies on the other. The most recent accelerant was Israel’s assassination of Hamas’ ceasefire negotiator Ismail Haniyeh in Iran. As the United States and its allies urge restraint in an effort to de-escalate, Iran and its proxies and Israel continue to trade shots, both figurative and literal. 

Support for Palestinians does not equal support for Iran

In his speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress on July 24, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu equated support for Palestine with support for Iran. But global and regional audiences don’t buy the black and white paradigm. Instead, they appear able to be sympathetic toward Palestinian civilians, angry with Israel over civilian casualties, and wary of Iran risking a broader conflict all at the same time.

In a special briefing, we previously noted that global audiences’ increased support for Palestine and ire toward Israel did not coincide with greater favorability of Hamas. Similarly, our data now shows that higher average support for Palestine and lower average support for Israel globally has not translated into more favorable views of Iran. 

This is also the case when assessed across several MENA countries where we survey. Not only is Iran consistently viewed unfavorably, but views of Hamas have declined in recent months, crossing into net negative territory in June 2024. Regional views of Iran are now roughly the same as they were right before Hamas’ attacks on Israel in October 2023, while views of Israel have dropped by roughly 20 points. 

Comparing across our country-level survey data on views of both Hamas and Palestine — which we ask about instead of the Palestinian Authority to prime sentiment surrounding statehood more so than governance — two main things stand out: (1) a larger number of countries exhibit net favorable sentiment toward Palestine than toward Hamas; and (2) in all countries where the public holds net-positive views of Hamas, views of Palestine are consistently more favorable, with the gap especially pronounced for Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia. In a nod to their staying power, these trends held in our May 2024 special briefing and continue to hold today.

Views of Iran and Hamas are more similar than views of Iran and Palestine

Netanyahu’s characterization of support for Palestine equating to support for Iran is true in that it certainly plays into Iran’s foreign policy to stoke protests against Israel’s military actions in Gaza. But at the country level, sympathy for the Palestinians does not coincide with support for Iran’s regional influence. Instead, views of Iran country by country more closely resemble views of Hamas than they do views of Palestine. 

But at least two outliers are worth noting in the context of rising regional conflict risk: Egypt and Saudi Arabia hold positive views of Hamas but solidly negative views of Iran, suggesting Iran’s regional power plays make it less popular in its near neighborhood. This contrasts with other countries with large Muslim populations that are further afield and thus geographically removed from the conflict — like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan — where public views of Iran are, to varying degrees, more favorable. 

Israel loses U.S. public support, but Netanyahu gets a bounce

As risks of a wider regional conflict move to the fore, Israel’s reputation remains solidly underwater in nearly all countries where we track public views of it on a daily basis (see Israel tab in chart above). U.S. views of Israel are just above neutral, marking their lowest point since we began tracking them in early 2021. Conversely, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose approval ratings were at all time lows from April-June 2024, has seen his support bounce since early July, putting him in striking range of his highest approval levels thus far in 2024. His address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress on July 24 surely helped. Going forward, the assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh may also assuage some domestic frustrations over intelligence failures which allowed for the Oct. 7 attacks, giving Netanyahu an additional boost. This is a dangerous dynamic, as it incentivizes Netanyahu to take actions he believes will aid his political survival, even if they escalate the conflict.

The likelihood and implications of a broader conflict

Intensive diplomacy has managed to forestall a broadening of the conflict in recent months, and may well do so again. However, the likelihood of a wider conflict is higher now than at any time since just after the Oct. 7 attacks. Aside from the obvious human cost, a wider regional conflict would be net negative for global business, with travel and supply chain disruptions, as well as political instability, adding to the ongoing geopolitical polycrisis and roiling global markets. 

A more overt Israel-Iran conflict, as opposed to the current shadow war, might however shift public perceptions, casting Israel once again in the role of a victim besieged by regional enemies rather than solely as an aggressor in a campaign with high civilian casualties. This, in turn, could cast the United States once more in the role of regional peacemaker, especially given Iran’s unpopularity among many of its Middle Eastern neighbors. These dynamics could ease some regional dissatisfaction with American support for Israel which, in recent months, has manifested itself as heightened corporate risk in the form of boycotts of U.S. companies and calls for divestment from Israel.

In light of all of the downsides, this would be a pallid silver lining indeed. And companies should expect a softening of regional risks more so than a return to normal: Global average favorability toward America — which we have found to be correlated with views of U.S. companies — has fallen roughly 10 points since the conflict began, and would require a dramatic reversal to return these and other risks to pre-war levels.