Is NATO dead? Europeans Think So.

Is NATO dead? 

This provocative question is being widely discussed on the eve of the June 24-26 NATO summit. Much of the Brussels and D.C. elite will run to the (oratory) defense of the alliance at the confab in the Hague, playing up the alliance’s joint capabilities, commitments, and rich history. In private, however, the mood will be sober. Six years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron said NATO was brain dead. Now Europe’s leaders may be wondering if U.S. President Trump has taken it off life support in his second term. Many of their constituents certainly think so. 

Most adults in major European NATO-allied countries say the alliance is no longer reliable

Majorities of adults in major NATO member states in Western Europe now overwhelmingly think the alliance is no longer strong or reliable in light of current politics. Ironically, most Americans don’t see the problem, believing the alliance remains so. The United Kingdom, as it so often does, sits somewhere between continental Europe and the United States. British adults have somewhat higher faith in the alliance than their European counterparts, but a majority of them still say NATO is no longer strong or reliable because of current politics. 

The United States is the source of the lack of trust 

If it needs to be said, “current politics” means U.S. President Donald Trump. Alliances rely on something more ephemeral than interoperable equipment and historical precedent. They rely on the mutual belief that their members will in fact help one another when push comes to shove. In a word, alliances rely on trust. The Trump administration has repeatedly threatened withdrawal from NATO and speculated that the United States may not defend some allies in the event of aggression, calling into question the strength of NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense. Ironically, only the United States has ever invoked the article, in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. 

Our daily surveys in 13 other NATO member states on public views of the United States and of NATO itself reveal that NATO itself enjoys a strong and stable reputation in member countries on average, but views of the United States are currently at a low ebb among other members. While economic actions like tariffs have had a major impact on the United States’ global reputation, we also see that economics isn’t the whole story. Among NATO member states in particular, Trump’s statements about annexing Greenland and J.D. Vance’s bombshell speech at the Munich Security Forum coincided with further slides in views of the United States. Indeed, April 2’s massive tariff announcement was far from the largest mover of opinion of the United States among these countries, and preceded a slight rebound in views. And lest one think that shifts in public opinion among U.S. allies simply reflects an anti-Trump knee-jerk reaction, views of the United States did not sink much as a group upon his election. It was later, once Trump took office and began getting to work, that the major shifts took place. 

It’s not us, it’s you

Many other factors shape public views of the United States besides concerns over a military alliance like NATO. For countries like Turkey, public views of both NATO and the United States had long signaled ambivalence. In other allied countries, views of the United States began sinking post-election or soon after Trump took office. In countries like Canada and Mexico, the declines came on the heels of imposed tariffs (and statements about annexation in the case of the former). In Germany and the United Kingdom, Trump administration members’ perceived meddling in their domestic politics seemed to contribute to sinking public opinion. And in some countries on NATO’s Eastern flank like Poland and Romania that tend to be staunchly pro-U.S. and security-minded, it was J.D. Vance’s speech in Munich that was the true wake-up call. 

All by design, members of the Trump administration would say. Scaring European allies into finally investing in their own defense rather than happily sitting under the U.S. security umbrella has been a stated objective of the Trump administration since before its first term. And this has arguably worked. The best example of the success of this approach is Germany’s recent €1 trillion defense and infrastructure package, alongside a new alliance proposal to raise members’ annual defense spending targets from 2% to 5% of gross domestic product, though actually implementing the new targets domestically is another matter. 

What happens when you lose the indispensable partner on an existential issue?

European politicians see Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an existential security issue, whereas the U.S. administration does not. If NATO member states are committed to the alliance and primarily concerned about Washington, what’s the problem? Can’t Europe just finally embrace more “strategic autonomy” as France has been advocating for some time? Unfortunately, the United States is, by most accounts (and much to Macron’s chagrin), the indispensable NATO member. Most experts agree that Europe-alone security guarantees for Ukraine will fail to convince either the Russians or the Ukrainians of the possibility of a durable peace. NATO allies simply do not have the materiel Ukraine needs to continue its fight for the long haul. For Europeans, the threat from Russia as illustrated by the war in Ukraine is the main reason to fight hard for ongoing U.S. involvement in  the alliance. 

The European Union has enough clout to hurt Trump’s trade and China policies

From the Trump administration’s perspective, even if it believes the United States has no essential interest in Ukraine and that Europe needs to take care of itself, a lasting policy rift with Europe could imperil some major policy priorities. The European Union, with its roughly 450 million relatively affluent consumers, could cause a lot of problems for Trump by undercutting his economic agenda, whether directly by imposing biting retaliatory tariffs, or indirectly by undermining the effectiveness of U.S. economic statecraft on other adversaries (read China). 

European leaders have their work cut out for them in convincing their citizens to get tougher on China. European public opinion has long been less hawkish than U.S. opinion on decoupling from China, at least in part due to Europe’s greater focus on Ukraine. And as our data shows, in Europe’s largest economies, consumers are not inclined to make economic tradeoffs in order to de-risk the China relationship, while a plurality of U.S. consumers say they are prepared to do so. 

The art of the (geopolitical) deal

This nevertheless shows that there is a potential deal to be made. The United States wants Europe to join its economic statecraft initiatives against China, like export controls on critical technologies and restrictions on using Chinese battery technology. Europe meanwhile wants the United States to stay engaged on Ukraine and in NATO. European leaders may not like the idea of a grand bargain, preferring to keep military and economic issues separate, especially given their heretofore fully split trade and defense competencies between the European Union and NATO. But linking issues might give them more leverage than they otherwise currently have in the military realm alone, even with spending increases set to be announced in coming days. Fortunately, Europe has a lot to offer in the way of both carrots and sticks to induce the Trump administration to keep coming back to the table. 

In order to make the kinds of issue linkages that could keep Trump at the table, Europe needs to find a way to speak with a non-NATO unified voice on defense. Efforts like Weimer+, the ReArm Europe Plan and the E.U.-U.K. security pact talks are steps in this direction. Not only do they move toward greater strategic autonomy, but they put Europe in a stronger position vis-à-vis the United States when seeking to keep Washington engaged in providing the aid that only it can currently provide. 

Institutions are notoriously hard to kill, and NATO is no exception. Reports of its death have been greatly exaggerated in the past, only for it to rise again to confront threats in the Balkans, and indeed to robustly confront the current crisis in Ukraine. So while NATO may indeed be down, don’t count it out just yet.