The United States’ Global Reputation Sinks After Trump’s Election Victory

We previously noted that our data suggested that many U.S.-allied nations were concerned by former President Trump’s possible return to office. In the days since his decisive election victory, foreign views of the United States — measured by average net favorability toward America among the general public  in a core basket of major global markets — have begun to dip. In a historical context, the decline is not massive, but it is notable. Views among a core group of countries for which we have data predating the Biden administration are now the most negative they have been since mid-2021.

At the tail end of the previous Trump administration, average favorability toward the United States among adults in these countries was much lower than it is now. Sentiment rebounded immediately following Biden’s election in November 2020, but the full effect was seen only after his inauguration, having been temporarily arrested by negative views sparked by the events of Jan. 6, 2020. We expect the main impact of President Trump’s return to office on the country’s reputation will be based on what he says and does once in the White House, but current shifts in views — which we examine in greater detail below — reflect global audiences’ expectations of how the next administration will act and can serve as a useful signpost for corporates worried about how the U.S.’ reputation may affect their own. 

Europe saw a dip, while the Middle East saw a jump

Region by region, public opinion has shifted in different ways since Trump’s victory. The clearest trends are visible in the Middle East and Africa, where the United States’ reputation peaked in 2024, and in Europe, where its reputation is currently at a low point. The United States’ overseas standing saw a smaller dip in the Asia Pacific region, while views of the United States in the Americas have mostly trended sideways. 

The Gulf states and Israel appear optimistic

The jump in favorability toward the United States in the Middle East since Election Day has not merely been driven by Israel — which will benefit from a solidly pro-Israel administration under Trump — but has also been driven by improving views in Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose populations are likely pleased by Trump’s hawkish stance on Iran and transactional policymaking. An absence of what regional potentates view as self-righteous moralizing about human rights will also be welcomed by some. The Abraham accords were one of the major foreign policy victories of Trump’s first term, and his administration is likely to push for normalization of relations between Israel and friendly Gulf states if the conflict in Gaza stabilizes, giving leaders in the region more leverage with Trump than with Biden. 

If we look at our data only among U.S. treaty allies — that is, countries with collective defense treaties with the United States — the negative trends we observe in Asia and Europe are amplified. (The United States does not have any mutual defense treaties in the Middle East or Africa besides Turkey, which is a member of NATO, so we we omit those regions here) 

Russians are pleased by Trump’s win, while the Chinese public appears indifferent

In Russia, views of the United States jumped on news of Trump’s election victory. Russian state media has generally portrayed Trump as the better outcome for Moscow’s interests, and in particular for a favorable resolution of its invasion of Ukraine. 

This comes as no surprise. Trump has vowed to rapidly end the war in Ukraine upon taking office, likely by pushing Kyiv to make territorial concessions to Moscow along existing battle lines under the threat of withdrawing U.S. military support, with no path to NATO or E.U. membership for Ukraine. Ukraine has said that a peace deal must invalidate Russia’s territorial gains, including its occupation of Crimea which Russia annexed in 2014. NATO’s position, meanwhile, has been a commitment to Ukraine’s eventual membership, a position now at odds with that of the incoming U.S. administration. Trump’s qualms with NATO are well-known, and he continues to threaten to withdraw the United States from the alliance. All of this helps explain both Russians’ glee and Europeans’ angst. 

Chinese state media, meanwhile, has reportedly been agnostic on the outcome of the election. Accordingly, there has been no discernible reaction among Chinese adults in our data. 

Chinese respondents’ non-reaction to the impending return to office of a politician promising to impose 60% tariffs on their exports to the United States is remarkable. However, Biden’s policy towards China was largely a continuation of his predecessor’s, with the Trump-era tariffs not only remaining in place, but expanding under Biden’s watch. Meanwhile Chinese Communist Party leaders have messaged that China is prepared to weather additional tariffs and to retaliate against the United States. Beijing may also see benefits to the ability to cut a deal directly with Trump. These complex dynamics may explain the relatively muted reaction in our data to date.

Global public views of the United States affects brands, business and foreign policy

Public opinion can matter in a number of ways. For industries which rely directly on foreigners having positive views of the United States, like tourism and higher education, public opinion can matter a great deal. It can also matter for U.S. companies serving consumers in other markets via exports or investment, as our country affinity work has shown. 

For U.S. foreign policy, it matters less directly, but it can still have an effect. No allied country’s leadership can afford not to work with the United States, and thus with its elected representatives. Washington’s interests, and those of its allies, also broadly remain the same, and so we expect that a major realignment will not be forthcoming. But cooperation is a matter of degree, rather than a binary. Public opinion can influence the extent to which countries contribute to collective defense, vote with the United States at the United Nations, and support U.S. security arrangements. 

From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, it is concerning that the largest drops in favorability of the United States are among America’s staunchest allies like Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom and other NATO members. Corporates should also watch these dynamics with concern: Relatively high income levels and close trade and investment ties with the United States mean that export market share and overseas revenue could be at stake if views of Washington’s activities further decrease U.S. reputation among these consumers. Officials in the first Trump administration were fond of saying “America first does not mean America alone.” If the incoming administration can learn to speak softly as well as carry a big stick, this could be entirely true.