Counter/Consensus: French Government Collapse, South Korean Martial Law, and Romanian Election Repeat

1. France (Consensus)

CCC+ you later. Morning Consult’s data-driven political risk rating for France dropped to CCC+ (tied for second-to-last place) at the end of October, with our analysts assigning a negative 6-month outlook. Prime Minister Michel Barnier’s government subsequently fell to a no-confidence vote on Dec. 5.

The primary drivers of the downgrade (and of the prime minister’s fall) included a fraught government formation process after President Emmanuel Macron’s center-right bloc failed to clinch a majority in July’s snap elections. Sentiment sank after Macron rejected an attempt by the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) alliance to form a government on the (likely valid) grounds that such a government would quickly fall in a no-confidence vote. Instead, Macron appointed Michel Barnier, a respected center-right former Brexit negotiator, whose government survived a no-confidence vote in early October with the help of the far right. Nevertheless, Barnier was presented with an uphill battle: a hostile left which won a plurality of the popular vote in recent elections, an opportunistic right with the leverage to topple his government, a dire budget situation, and a highly dissatisfied public. Barnier’s belt-tightening budget bill released in mid-October subsequently angered many, including Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, who withdrew crucial support, precipitating the PM’s fall. Barnier will remain in place as head of a caretaker government, but with more limited powers, excluding the ability to pass a budget. 

We agree with the consensus that France is not remotely out of the woods. President Emmanuel Macron is experiencing his lowest approval rating since we began tracking it in late 2018 yet is ignoring voices calling on him to step down before the end of his term in 2027. He is meanwhile coming under pressure from all sides of the political spectrum to name a new prime minister, and may do so imminently. But it’s unclear who he could find to lead a government which will have to walk the razor’s edge between the fractious left and the muscular right. In the meantime, the abysmal budget situation is roiling markets as fears rise of a Euro crisis sparked by the zone’s second largest economy. French adults themselves are far from optimistic, with their views of France’s trajectory at tracking lows.

The French population’s lack of faith in the Fifth Republic’s trajectory and in Macron’s ability to change it leads us to agree with media narratives predicting further instability in France in coming months.

2. South Korea (Counter)

Korean carousel. Another country tied for second-to-last place in our political risk ratings at CCC+ as of the end of November was South Korea, outmatched only by Peru. The Southeast Asian democracy and key U.S. ally has since had a sobering scrape with authoritarianism after President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law on Dec. 3. He reversed the order six hours later, after parliament voted against it and protestors took to the streets to decry the move. The crisis is ongoing. Yoon has refused to resign and has survived one impeachment vote, but meanwhile has been barred from leaving the country and is reportedly being investigated for treason. Some members of his own party are also pushing him to resign, which would trigger a special election within 60 days. 

Yoon — who came to power in 2022 in South Korea’s closest election ever — justified his declaration of martial law as necessary to control “anti-state” and communist forces, the continuation of a narrative Yoon has used for some time. His continuously declining approval ratings (chart below) show this has largely been unsuccessful. And the declaration of martial law itself has sharply intensified disapproval by spiking the share of Korean adults who “strongly disapprove” of Yoon. 

In the days following the martial law declaration, much of the discussion surrounding the impact of a potential change in leadership has focused on foreign policy. Yoon’s administration has taken a less conciliatory line toward China, and he has sought to preempt future Trump administration demands by negotiating a five-year cost-sharing agreement underpinning the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula. He has also championed strategic diplomatic rapprochement with Japan — a country with which South Korea has deep historical animosities — to shore up a common bulwark against China in Asia. 

We agree with narratives pointing out that the Korean opposition will have different approaches to Japan, China and the United States. In particular, Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung has built his career on anti-Japanese policies, making the rapprochement with Japan the piece of Yoon’s foreign policy that would be most at risk. 

But our data indicates that Yoon’s foreign policy has also been largely in line with trends in public sentiment about allies and adversaries that predate his tenure. South Koreans’ favorability toward Japan is at a tracking high, trending upwards and very nearly net positive. The current Japanese PM Shigeru Ishiba has meanwhile been amenable to a continued improvement of relations against the regional backdrop of an increasingly assertive China, although his planned trip to Seoul has been postponed in light of recent developments.

In parallel, South Koreans have no love lost for China, showing consistently negative views of their northwestern neighbor and highly positive views of their treaty ally, the United States. Their views of China have become more negative since the COVID-19 pandemic, although they have slightly rebounded since early 2022 (albeit to very negative levels around -75). South Korean favorability toward the United States is the mirror image of this, starting out lower around net neutral in mid-2020, but rising to levels around +30 before dipping following Trump’s recent re-election.

Despite the public’s outrage over Yoon’s martial law declaration, Yoon’s foreign policy — though highly criticized by the opposition — has largely reflected preexisting trends in Korean sentiment. While the improving relationship with Japan is both the most ambiguous and the most at risk of reversal, the new U.S. administration could use its auspices to pressure a future South Korean president to play nice with Japan in the name of regional stability. While certainly not guaranteeing a continuation of his policies, we think trends in public sentiment will at least provide a check on a future president who might wish to execute a complete 180 on foreign policy.

3. Romania (Counter)

Redo, Romania. Over the weekend the Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the Nov. 24 first-round presidential election results due to Russian interference. Declassified intelligence reports alleged that Moscow orchestrated an illegal last-minute social media campaign to boost the candidacy of ultra-nationalist, pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu, who won the first round with roughly 23% of the vote. 

The decision sparked domestic and international controversy, with opponents of the move worried about the possibly anti-Democratic nature of a court forcing a repeated election after the fact, and proponents pointing to the necessity of upholding rules on election interference. 

Many commentators focused on the remarkable nature of the last-minute rise in support for the independent candidate Georgescu, and tied it to right-wing movements across the continent. Romania, like many countries in Europe, has seen a rise in the share of adults saying they hold far-right views. But per our data, the increase has been relatively small, and the overall share does not account for Georgescu’s surprise victory. 

What may also help to explain the independent candidate’s strong showing is the fact that a plurality of Romanians felt their views were unrepresented by the major political parties heading into the election. Back in February, we wrote that the rightward trend in Europe is based more on anti-establishment sentiment than it is on right-wing ideology, and highlighted countries where the majority of respondents said that none of the primary political parties in their country held views that were close to their own. Romania is one such country. 

From Nov. 9-Dec. 9, 2024, the center-left Social Democratic Party (PSD) had the most support among adults, and indeed it came out on top in parliamentary elections on Dec. 1. The far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) garnered the second highest percentage of the parliamentary vote, followed by Save Romania Union (USR). But 26% of Romanian adults said that none of the parties had views close to their own over the last 30 days. In the presidential vote — which tends to be more personal — those disillusioned voters may have played a more prominent role, as the votes were not held the same day, and different voters may have turned out. 

The electoral mulligan will probably not have the intended effect. It appears that disenchanted voters who previously said no party reflected their views are shifting primarily to the far-right AUR party after its strong showing in parliamentary elections. 

Georgescu may or may not be able to run in the repeated election which should take place in Q1 2025. But far-right AUR also fielded a presidential candidate, George Simion, who came in third with a little over 14% of the vote. Should Georgescu’s supporters shift to Simion, he would handily defeat second-place Elena Lasconi of the Save Romania Union party (USR).

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